

Security and Authorization

CS430/630
Lecture 18

Slides based on "Database Management Systems" 3rd ed, Ramakrishnan and Gehrke

Definitions

- ▶ **Security policy**
 - ▶ specifies who is authorized to do what
- ▶ **Security mechanism**
 - ▶ allows to **enforce** a chosen security policy
- ▶ **Terminology**
 - ▶ Users = **Subjects** or **Principals**
 - ▶ Data = **Objects**
- ▶ **Two important functions needed to achieve security**
 - ▶ **Authentication (AuthN)**
 - ▶ **Authorization (AuthZ)**

Authentication

- ▶ Establishing the **identity** of the user, or **who** the user is
- ▶ Subjects (users) present authentication **credentials**
 - ▶ Username/Password combination – “what user knows”
 - ▶ Digital certificates (cryptographic tokens) – “what user has”
 - ▶ Biometrics – “what user is”
- ▶ Some credential types stronger than others
 - ▶ For high-security applications, **multi-factor** authentication
 - ▶ E.g., password + fingerprint

Authorization

- ▶ Once we know who the user is, what can s/he access?
 - ▶ What objects (data) the subjects is allowed access to?
 - ▶ What kind of operations is the subject allowed to perform?
 - ▶ Read-only, modify, append
 - ▶ Authorization also referred to as access control
- ▶ **Two main categories of access control**
 - ▶ **Discretionary**: object owner decides authorization policy for its objects (Unix system)
 - ▶ **Mandatory**: system-wide rules that dictate who gets to access what (multi-level security, Bell-LaPadula)

Discretionary Access Control

- ▶ Based on the concept of access rights or **privileges**
 - ▶ Privileges for objects (tables and views)
 - ▶ Mechanisms for granting and revoking privileges
- ▶ Object creator automatically gets all privileges on it
 - ▶ DBMS keeps track of who subsequently gains and loses privileges
 - ▶ DBMS ensures that only requests from users who have the necessary privileges (at the time the request is issued) are allowed

GRANT Command

- ```
GRANT privilege_list ON object TO user_list [WITH GRANT OPTION]
```
- ▶ The following **privileges** can be specified:
    - ▶ **SELECT**
      - ▶ can read all columns
      - ▶ including those added later via ALTER TABLE command
    - ▶ **INSERT(col-name)**
      - ▶ can insert tuples with non-null or non-default values in this column
      - ▶ INSERT means same right with respect to all columns
    - ▶ **DELETE**
      - ▶ can delete tuples
    - ▶ **REFERENCES (col-name)**
      - ▶ can define foreign keys (in other tables) that refer to this column

## GRANT Command (contd)

- ▶ If a privilege is granted with **GRANT OPTION**, the grantee can pass privilege on to other users
  - ▶ Special **ALL PRIVILEGES** privilege
- ▶ Only owner can execute CREATE, ALTER, and DROP

## Examples

**GRANT INSERT, SELECT ON Sailors TO Horatio**

- ▶ Horatio can query Sailors or insert tuples into it

**GRANT DELETE ON Sailors TO Yuppy WITH GRANT OPTION**

- ▶ Yuppy can delete tuples, and also authorize others to do so

**GRANT INSERT (rating) ON Sailors TO Dustin**

- ▶ Dustin can insert (only) the *rating* field of Sailors tuples

## REVOKE Command


```
REVOKE [GRANT OPTION FOR] privilege_list ON object
FROM user_list [CASCADE | RESTRICT]
```

- ▶ **REVOKE**
  - ▶ Revokes privileges
- ▶ **CASCADE**: when a privilege is revoked from X, it is also revoked from all users who got it *solely* from X
  - ▶ Privilege is said to be **ABANDONED**
  - ▶ A graph with the granting relationship is maintained
- ▶ **RESTRICT**: if revoke causes some privilege to be abandoned, it is NOT executed


## Authorization Graph







- ▶ Keeps track of active authorization on objects
  - ▶ Each authorization ID (user) corresponds to a node
  - ▶ Granting a privilege adds **labeled** edge to graph
  - ▶ Removing privilege deletes one or more edges from graph
  - ▶ Special "**System**" node that originates all privileges
  - ▶ Note: it is possible to have multiple edges between same pair of nodes (with same direction)!
- ▶ How to determine if access is allowed for an ID?
  - ▶ There must be a **path** from System to that ID formed of privileges equal (or stronger) than the one required





## Authorization Graph



## Authorization Graph







- ### Security at the Level of a Field!
- ▶ Can create a view that only returns one field of one tuple
    - ▶ Then grant access to that view accordingly
  - ▶ Allows for *arbitrary* granularity of control, *but*:
    - ▶ Tedious to specify and maintain policies
    - ▶ Performance is unacceptable
      - ▶ Too many view creations and look-ups
  - ▶ Another solution
    - ▶ Attach labels to subjects and objects
    - ▶ Create rules of access based on labels

- ### Mandatory Access Control
- ▶ Based on system-wide policies that cannot be changed by individual users (even if they own objects)
    - ▶ Each DB object is assigned a security class
    - ▶ Each subject (user or user program) is assigned a clearance for a security class
    - ▶ Rules based on security classes and clearances govern who can read/write which objects.
  - ▶ Many commercial systems do not support mandatory access control
    - ▶ Some specialized versions do
      - ▶ e.g., those used in military applications

## Bell-LaPadula Model

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▶ Security classes:

- ▶ Top secret (TS)
- ▶ Secret (S)
- ▶ Confidential (C)
- ▶ Unclassified (U):
- ▶  $TS > S > C > U$

▶ Each object (O) and subject (S) is assigned a class

- ▶ S can read O only if  $class(S) \geq class(O)$  (Simple Security Property or No Read Up)
  - ▶ S can write O only if  $class(S) \leq class(O)$  (\*-Property or No Write Down)
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## Intuition

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- ▶ Idea is to ensure that information can never flow from a higher to a lower security level
  - ▶ The mandatory access control rules are applied in addition to any discretionary controls that are in effect
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